Advocate Writer

Analyzing FCA's Claims: Are They Misleading or Misrepresented?

I’ve often encountered FCA paraphrasing the claim that Active Head Restraints (AHRs) pose "virtually zero chance of injuring anyone," regardless of age or gender, during a random deployment. Let’s play devil’s advocate and critically examine the inconsistencies in their narrative.

First stop: Their own user manuals acknowledge that injury can occur if the AHRs are accidentally deployed. This raises questions about how their public assurances align with the realities outlined in their official documentation.

Figure 1: IIHS pre-crash test dummy placement showing a significant distance between the head and the Active Head Restraint (AHR)

Figure 2: IIHS crash test depiction of dummy head position relative to AHR at the moment of deployment, still not head contact.

The IIHS crash test images highlight a critical design assumption: the head is not meant to contact the AHR until it has fully extended. View the AHR vs. Airbag Deployment Speed Comparison featuring time-stamped, slow-motion footage of a full AHR deployment. This deployment occurs in approximately 14 thousandths of a second—nearly three times faster than an airbag. The head doesn’t even move before the rear crash shockwave hits; it’s lightning fast. In these controlled tests, the dummy's head begins at a significant distance from the AHR, ensuring minimal risk of injury during deployment—or, as FCA might argue, 'virtually zero chance of injury.'

However, this scenario fails to account for real-world conditions where a driver’s head might already be in close proximity to the AHR during a random, defective, or "accidental" deployment—like mine was at the moment of deployment. In such cases, the rapid extension of the AHR introduces a heightened risk of injury that is overlooked in these idealized test conditions. FCA's assertion of 'virtually zero chance of harm' becomes misleading when applied beyond the carefully controlled parameters of crash tests.
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Figure 3-

AI identifies selective representation in pre-crash dummy placement, where heads are positioned far from the AHR to minimize risk.
Figure 4-

AI can uncover subtle forms of selective representation in FCA’s safety claims. Through analysis of pre-crash dummy placement, the AI highlights that controlled tests ensure the dummy’s head remains far enough away from the AHR to avoid contact during deployment. This setup creates an idealized outcome, supporting FCA’s assertion of 'virtually zero chance of injury.' However, this controlled environment fails to address the risks posed by real-world seating positions, where proximity to the AHR can significantly increase the chance of harm.
Figure 9

Jeep Pinball Illustration

My Visual representation of the chaos caused by unintended AHR deployments.

This visual captures the unpredictability of random AHR deployments, likening the experience to a pinball machine—a sudden, jarring event where heads are struck or thrown by the force of deployment. Imagine an old-school pinball machine, where the flipper hits the ball with perfect timing, sending it crashing into the glass. That’s how it felt when my AHR deployed.

My head was turned slightly at an angle, as if looking toward the driver’s side mirror, and was moving backward as I shut the Jeep door. The close proximity of my head to the AHR compounded the force of the impact when it exploded, amplifying the chaotic, flipper-like effect of the deployment.

The question remains: Was the system designed to protect drivers and passengers—or to inadvertently harm them by catapulting their heads into harm’s way?

Imagine my doctors’ concerns when they heard of me riding in the passenger seat of my Jeep, seated in front of a potentially defective, undeployed AHR, while my wife drives me to appointments after my C4-7 ACDF fusion. The fear of being injured again is very real. FCA’s refusal to replace that potentially defective undeployed AHR with a 'fresh one,' reportedly free of the defect, demonstrates a lack of regard for customer safety.
Figure 5 :

Proximity and Lack of Warnings

"Drivers and passengers often sit much closer to AHRs than the crash test dummies used in controlled environments."

Do people typically drive with their heads positioned as far from the AHR as the crash test dummies in FCA's controlled tests? Have drivers ever been informed to avoid leaning closer to these active devices? After all, there are no visible markings or warnings on the AHR to indicate that it is an active mechanism capable of sudden, legitimate deployments during a car accident—let alone random deployments caused by defects or so-called 'accidental deployments,' which FCA Chrysler itself admits can cause injury.

This lack of public awareness creates significant risks, especially for those with pre-existing conditions such as cervical arthritis, veterans with PTSD, elderly individuals, or others with heightened vulnerability to impact injuries. These groups are left uninformed and unprotected by a system designed without transparency or accountability.

Figure 7

FCA’s Safety Claims vs. Real-World Complaints

"FCA’s own data reveals thousands of complaints and hundreds of injuries tied to AHR failures."

FCA has received over 4,000 complaints concerning failed headrests, with 439 involving allegations of injuries, predominantly among women and children. Despite these reports, FCA has continued to argue that the risk of injury from AHR deployments is negligible. This selective representation ignores the significant concerns raised by the public, including 404 individuals who were so alarmed they reported directly to the NHTSA.

These numbers highlight a stark contrast between FCA’s claims of safety and the real-world experiences of drivers and passengers.

When FCA states to the media that 'there is no defect,' are they only addressing one side of the issue—focusing on whether the problem is 'widespread' enough to justify a recall? This language sidesteps the real-world harm these devices have caused, as evidenced by thousands of complaints and hundreds of injury claims.

The NHTSA's role also comes into question: Is the agency truly working to protect us, or has it been compromised in some way? These unanswered questions cast doubt on both FCA’s accountability and the regulatory safeguards meant to protect the public.

Figure 6

Crash Test Data and Real-World Discrepancies

"Real-world seating positions often place heads closer to the AHR, exposing passengers to risks ignored in controlled crash tests."

  How was the distance between the crash test dummy's head and the AHR established for these tests? Can anyone show me a recommendation in any user manual specifying a safe driving distance—measured in inches—to maintain between a passenger’s head and the AHR? While the manuals offer instructions on adjusting the AHR’s height relative to ear level, they don’t address the possibility of deployment or proximity risks. Most drivers don’t even know they have an AHR behind their head.

Now imagine a deposition or courtroom scenario where an injured claimant is forced to answer 'yes or no' to this question from a skilled FCA attorney:
'Did you view the crash test dummy video?'
'Yes.'
'Would you agree that the video demonstrates virtually zero chance of injury to a properly seated crash test dummy during a random deployment?'

Without the opportunity for elaboration, the claimant might have to agree, based on what the crash test shows. But that’s not the real world. In reality, drivers and passengers are often seated much closer to the AHR than crash test conditions account for. The controlled tests fail to consider the risks posed by proximity during an accidental or defective deployment.

 Figure 8

Risk of Injury for Vulnerable Populations

"FCA’s internal data shows several instances of distraction-related accidents tied to AHR failures."

Among the complaints filed, FCA’s own records show that seven accidents resulted from driver distraction caused by inadvertent AHR deployment. These incidents raise serious concerns for vulnerable groups, such as elderly individuals, veterans with PTSD, or those with pre-existing conditions, who may face even greater risks from sudden, forceful deployments.

Despite these documented cases, FCA has maintained its stance that the overall risk remains insignificant—a claim that fails to acknowledge the human cost of these incidents.

FCA’s claim of 'virtually zero chance of harm' raises significant questions: Does this refer only to physical injuries, or does it ignore mental and emotional harm? What about those with pre-existing conditions—protected under the 'eggshell head doctrine'—whose doctors testify that these deployments caused serious harm? This language appears to deliberately obscure the full scope of the issue, creating confusion and minimizing the voices of affected individuals.

Figure 10

FCA’s Internal Safety Analysis


"Court findings reveal FCA’s downplaying of the material significance of AHR failures."

Court documents from Costa v. FCA reveal that FCA downplayed the extent and significance of AHR failures, arguing that the problem was not 'significant, substantial, or widespread.' This legal tactic attempts to sideline the real safety concerns of affected drivers and passengers while focusing solely on statistical probabilities to avoid accountability.

FCA’s logic becomes even harder to defend when considering their claim that it’s unsafe to drive with a deployed AHR but safe to drive with a potentially defective one. How does this make sense? If a fully deployed AHR is unsafe, wouldn’t it be equally unsafe to rely on a device that could fail without warning? If a fully deployed AHR can still mitigate whiplash, why weren’t these devices designed to remain permanently deployed in the first place? Was this a cosmetic decision disguised as a matter of 'comfort'?
Figure 11

Broader Implications for Corporate Accountability

"FCA’s history of legal violations underscores a broader pattern of corporate misconduct."


This issue is not isolated—FCA’s history includes numerous reported legal violations and settlements. The problem extends beyond AHRs, highlighting a broader pattern of corporate misconduct that prioritizes profits over safety. As citizens, we must demand greater accountability from corporations, including stricter oversight, meaningful penalties, and criminal consequences for executives who knowingly endanger the public.

Ultimately, FCA’s approach appears to prioritize corporate optics over public safety. These unresolved questions—about the safety of deployed vs. undeployed AHRs, the role of NHTSA, and the company’s refusal to address real-world fears—highlight a deeper issue. It’s time for citizens to demand transparency, accountability, and stricter oversight to prevent further harm.